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Abstract: The program of a physical concept of information is outlined in
the framework of quantum theory. A proposal is made for how to avoid the
introduction of axiomatic observables. The conventional (collapse) and the
Everett interpretations of quantum theory may in principle lead to different
dynamical consequences. Finally, a formal ensemble description not based
on a concept of lacking information is discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the conventional interpretation of quantum theory, the wave function or
state vector describing a physical system evolves in time according to two
different laws: (a) the Schro¨dinger equation, being deterministic in the sense
that the wave function is determined completely if given at a certain time,
and (b) the “reduction” or “collapse”, which describes the transition of the
wave function into one member of a set of mutually orthogonal states, this
set (defining an “observable” up to scale transformations) being phenomeno-
logically associated with a certain type of measurement.
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The second kind of time evolution has to be taken into account regardless
of whether it is called “real” or “due to the increase of information”, in
particular since communication is to be considered a physical process.
All attempts to derive the reduction from a Schro¨dinger equation for
the total system including the measurement apparatus have been shown to
be doomed to failure [1,2]. Derivations from a master equation seem to be
more appropriate but lead to (apparently related) difficulties in deriving the
master equation itself [3]. In both cases similar pseudo-arguments are often
introduced by using an abstract a priori concept of information instead of
a physical one.
Everett proposed an interpretation of quantum theory that avoids the
reduction of the wave function, and instead postulates the universal validity
of the Schro¨dinger equation [4]. This means that the “other” components
(which would disappear according to the reduction postulate) still “exist”
after a measurement. However, they are correlated with different states of
the apparatus and subsequently with different states of human observers.
Therefore Everett has to assume that “we are aware” of only one of these
world components, and that the world apparently “splits” into many com-
ponents whenever a measurement-like process occurs.
Is it not entirely meaningless to postulate the existence of world com-
ponents that are not observed? Even if the latter were true, it would at
least be conventional to regard those things as “existing in reality” which
are extrapolated from the observed by means of established laws. It will be
demonstrated in Section 3, however, that the different world components
may interact if the total wave function obeys a Schro¨dinger equation – as
assumed by Everett. Consequently, in spite of the linearity of the equation
of motion, the time evolution of the “observed component” might show a
dependence on the other components.
Proposals to avoid the reduction by considering several successive mea-
surements as one correlation experiment [5] either leave the process of “prepa-
ration” of the initial state conceptually unexplained or have to refer to a
universal wave function again. In the latter case, all measurements (in the
widest sense) ever performed must be considered as one great correlation
experiment (that is still going on). None of these interpretations describes
the complete process of observation (including the increase of information)
by means of a Schro¨dinger equation.
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2. PHYSICAL DETERMINATION OF OBSERVABLES
The Everett interpretation in itself is not complete. There are many possi-
bilities of decomposing a wave function into components
ψ =
∑
i
φiΦ
(i) (1)
where φi are orthogonal states of a considered system, while the Φ
(i) are
the corresponding “relative states” of the “remainder of the universe”. Ev-
erett suggested a decomposition with respect to different “memory states”
without specifying them physically. In analogy to superselection rules, this
proposal thus excludes a splitting into superpositions of different memory
states. The phenomenological selection of memory states corresponds to
the axiomatic introduction of observables in the conventional description of
measurements.
An essential property of memory states is their stability with respect to
external perturbations, even though they may in turn easily affect their en-
vironment [6]. (Consider pointer positions, books, or different DNS chains.)
This property will cause a strong correlation of memory properties with the
remainder of the world. Dynamical stability (“robustness”) is therefore sug-
gestive as a criterion for states with respect to which the universal wave
function splits (or, alternatively, collapses).
Another possibility of specifying the splitting is based on the fundamen-
tal subject-object relation of observation. Assume the total system to be
conceptually cut into two subsystems, one containing the object, the other
one the observer. Then there is an essentially unique decomposition of the
total wave function into a single sum of orthonormal states for both subsys-
tems (the “Schmidt canonical form”) [7],
ψ(t) =
∑
i
√
pi(t)φi(t)Φi(t) . (2)
For dynamical and statistical reasons, this decomposition tends to keep dif-
ferent memory states in different terms of the series, irrespective of the cut’s
precise position. (In contrast to Bohr’s epistemology, the cut does here not
have to be interpreted as one between quantum and classical concepts.)
An Everett branching in terms of dynamically stable states has the disad-
vantage of being conceptually approximate, while that based on the Schmidt
representation depends on the position of the cut. Nonetheless, the second
3
version will be preferred in the following. (One knows from the pragmatic
rules of quantum theory that the cut has to be put “far enough” away from
the object, that is, close enough to the observer [8]. Therefore it may be
chosen to have on the observer’s side only the physical carrier of his con-
sciousness – perhaps the cerebral cortex or parts thereof – thus keeping even
his personal memory in the “outside world”. If the cut were placed some-
where in between object and observer, the Schmidt decomposition would be
too fine-grained. A reduction to one of the components of (2) would then
describe a much greater increase of information than that according to the
axiomatic observables.)
3. CAN THE EVERETT INTERPRETATION BE VERIFIED?
Provided the wave function ψ(t) of some total system exists and obeys a
Schro¨dinger equation, the coefficients and components of expansion (2) vary
in time according to the nonlinear set of equations [9]
h¯
d
√
pi
dt
= Im〈φiΦi|H|ψ〉
ih¯
dΦi
dt
=
∑
j(6=i)
√
pi〈φiΦj|H|ψ〉 − √pj〈ψ|H|φjΦi〉
pi − pj Φj
ih¯
dφi
dt
=
∑
j(6=i)
√
pi〈φjΦi|H|ψ〉 − √pj〈ψ|H|φiΦj〉
pi − pj φj
+
√
piRe〈φiΦi|H|ψ〉φi (3)
(Note added: the asymmetry between the second and third equation can
be avoided by choosing a more appropriate, symmetric phase convention for
the factor states of (2) – see Ph. Pearle, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 18, 489 (1979).)
The “probability resonances” 1/(pi−pj) appearing in (3) drop out from the
time derivatives of the reduced density matrices,
ih¯
dρΦ
dt
:= ih¯
d
∑
piΦiΦ
∗
i
dt
=
∑
i,j
(√
pi〈φiΦj|H|ψ〉 − √pj〈ψ|H|φjΦi〉
)
ΦiΦ
∗
j (4)
and correspondingly for ρφ =
∑
i piφiφ
∗
i . Only for vanishing interaction
(H = Hφ +HΦ) or when the wave function happens to factorize (pi = δii0)
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does one recover the Schro¨dinger equation, for example
ih¯
dφi0
dt
=
∑
j
〈φj |H(i0)φ |φi0〉φj , (5)
where the effective i-dependent Hamiltonian H
(i)
φ = 〈Φi|H|Φi〉 in our phase
convention includes the Φi-energy (but see Pearle, l.c.). And only for special
initial conditions is (4) approximated by an autonomous master equation for
the density matrix.
Equations (3) lead to a number of phenomena that are not present in
the collapse interpretation. For example, time-reversed branchings (recom-
binations) may occur. If the other branches are not known, recombinations
have to be interpreted as irreproducible events.
It is particularly interesting to study dynamical effects relating states
of different “memory”. Memory states φi are here defined as dynamically
stable ones in the presence of a “normal” environment (consider the chiral
states of a sugar molecule as a simple example). This means
〈φiΦj |H|φi′Φj′〉 ≈ δii′〈Φj|H(i)Φ |Φj′〉 (6)
for all relevant environmental states Φj.
Whenever an element of the Schmidt form coincides with one of these
stable states, the time derivative of the corresponding coefficient vanishes,
h¯
d
√
pi
dt
≈ √pi Im〈φiΦi|H|φiΦi〉 = 0 , (7)
so this component keeps its probability. If the non-negligible other elements
are stable, too, their “relative states” Φi can be shown by some rearrange-
ment of the second equation (3) to vary according to
ih¯
dΦi
dt
=
∑
j(6=i)
[
〈Φj |H(i)Φ |Φi〉 −
pj
pi − pj 〈Φj|H
(j)
Φ −H(i)Φ |Φi〉
]
Φj , (8)
while even the “stable” state itself is bound to change non-trivially in this
representation:
ih¯
dφi
dt
=
∑
j(6=i)
√
pipj
pi − pj 〈Φi|(H
(i)
Φ −H(j)Φ )|Φj〉φj + pi〈Φi|H(i)Φ |Φi〉φi . (9)
If Φ describes a macroscopic system, while H
(i)
Φ and H
(j)
Φ differ sufficiently,
Φi and Φj must soon differ in many degrees of freedom, and the (partial)
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matrix elements 〈Φi|H|Φj〉 become extremely small for i 6= j. The Schmidt
states then tend to stick to the dynamically stable states [3].
If a stable state φi occurs as a pure state, pi = 1, its “rate of desepara-
tion” (or entanglement rate – see Eq. (12a) of Ref. 9),
A =
∑
j(6=i)j′(6=i)
|〈φjΦj′|H|φiΦi〉|2 , (10)
vanishes. This quantity A measures the entanglement rate of initially fac-
torizing systems in second order of time. If the initial state happens to be a
superposition of stable states, e.g. ψ = (φi + φj)Φ/
√
2, A can be written in
the form ||P⊥(H(i)Φ − H(j)Φ )Φ||2/2, where P⊥ := 1 − |Φ〉〈Φ| is the projector
on to the complement space of Φ.
The resonance terms of (8) and (9) in principle distinguish the Everett
version dynamically from the collapse version of quantum theory. If two
coefficients pi of the Schmidt decomposition seem to intersect in time, this
leads to a behavior similar to that known from two crossing energy levels
when an external parameter is changed. In particular, the coefficients of two
world components do not cross unless their Hamiltonian matrix element
vanishes exactly. Instead they repel each other, thereby exchanging their
states. This appears to be a very drastic effect. However, since the states
also exchange their memory, any observer existing in one of the components
will “believe” to be the causal successor of an observer in the other Schmidt
branch. The event would be felt only during the (in general extremely
short) time of resonance when superpositions of memory states may form
the Schmidt representation. It is again irreproducible unless the “other”
components were distributed in a regular way.
One should keep in mind that the dynamical equations (3) are based on
the assumption of a time-independent cut. This may not be entirely realistic
for the present purpose.
The resonance terms cannot occur in the collapse version. The latter
requires nonlinear and time direction-dependent terms in the equation of
motion [10]. In Everett’s interpretation, the absence, in reality, of recombi-
nations (or, more generally, the approximately autonomous dynamics of dif-
ferent world components) can be derived from the assumption of sufficiently
small amplitudes for most “other” components, that is, from a statistically
improbable cosmological initial condition.
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4. INFORMATION CONCEPT IN STATISTICAL PHYSICS
The Φ-system, say, may be further divided into two subsystems. Its Schmidt
states may then again be expanded in analogy to (2):
Φi =
∑
α
√
qiαχ
(1)
iα χ
(2)
iα . (11)
For microscopic sytems, no further reduction or branching would in general
be meaningful with respect to this decomposition, as is well known from
many kinds of Einstein-Podolski-Rosen phenomena [11].
Now assume that the states χ
(1)
iα contain some dynamically stable degrees
of freedom, labeled by an index n,
χ
(1)
iα =
∑
nm
c(iα)nm χ
(1)
nm , (12)
where m describes all other degrees of freedom. Assume further that the
memory properties n do not only affect the remainder of the world, χ(2),
but may also allow their “observation” (by means of a von Neumann-type
interaction) by the φ-system (now regarded as the observer),
φiχ
(1)
nmχ
(2)
iα → φinχ(1)nmχ(2)iαn , (13)
with different final states of the observer, 〈φin|φin′〉 ≈ δnn′ . If, as a conse-
quence of the “cosmological assumption” mentioned at the end of Section
3, the Everett decomposition with respect to i is not affected by the further
decomposition with respect to n (that is, 〈φin|φi′n′〉 ≈ δnn′δii′), the new
Schmidt decomposition becomes
ψ =
∑
in
φinΦ
(in) , (14)
with not yet normalized though orthogonal relative states
Φ(in) =
√
pi
∑
αm
√
qiαc
(iα)
nm χ
(1)
nmχ
(2)
iαn . (15)
(Note added: Here one assumes that the observer states possess a sufficient
memory capacity, that is, low entropy.) The norm of these relative states is
〈Φ(in)|Φ(in)〉 = pi
∑
αα′m
√
qiαqiα′c
(iα)
nm c
∗(iα′)
nm 〈χ(2)iα′n|χ(2)iαn〉
≈ pi
∑
αm
qiα|c(iα)nm |2 (16)
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when assuming random phases. The Schmidt representation now includes
the memory states n,
ψ ≈
∑
in
√
pi
∑
αm
qiα|c(iα)nm |2φinΦin , (17)
where normalized Φin are used instead of the relative states Φ
(in).
If the components of the Everett decomposition are weighted by their
squared norms [6], the branching ratio between n and n′ is
∑
αm qiα|ciαnm|2∑
αm qiα|ciαn′m|2
=
tr[Pnρ
(1)
i ]
tr[Pn′ρ
(1)
i ]
, (18)
with
Pn =
∑
m
|χ(1)nm〉〈χ(1)nm| and ρ(1)i =
∑
α
qiα|χ(1)iα 〉〈χ(1)iα | . (19)
This is equivalent to averaging over an ensemble of pure states χ
(1)
iα with
weights qiα (i fixed), defining in general a large value of the entropy S
(1)
i =
−∑α qiαlnqiα. A quantum theory of observation along the lines suggested
here therefore leads to (fictitious) ensembles without introducing an a priori
concept of information [3,12], in contrast to the Gibbs-Jaynes concept, for
example [13]. In the language of d’Espagnat [14], there are no proper mix-
tures. The constraints describing known expectation values, chosen ad hoc
and taken into account by means of Lagrangian multipliers by Jaynes, are
here determined physically, controlled by questions of dynamical stability.
The major problem of classical statistical mechanics – How can ensem-
bles be justified? – is thereby reversed: How can microscopic systems be
prepared in pure states? This is obviously achieved by correlating the states
of a microscopic system completely with the observer system φ and taking
into account the Everett branching (or the reduction). This process de-
scribes what in common language is called an increase of information. In
practice, it is performed by correlating the micro-system with appropriate
memory states of an intervening system (a measuring device). The stability
of memory states leads to an “objectivization” of the corresponding mea-
surement results. Microscopic systems are usually reduced to their energy
eigenstates by means of the interactions with the electromagnetic quantum
field in an expanding and absorbing universe.
Although we are led to describe physical systems by apparent ensembles
of states, the special role played by canonical ensembles is not immediately
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obvious. In particular, since the χ1-system, say, is dynamically described by
an equation analogous to (4), there is in general no Hamiltonian (not even
a time-dependent one) with respect to which the canonical ensemble could
be defined. On the other hand, the non-existence of information beyond the
mean energy about systems containing no memory states is plausible from
dynamical considerations corresponding to Poincare’s theorem concerning
the non-analyticity of the constants of motion. The non-separability of
quantum systems may then be regarded as a quantum mechanical analog of
this classical theorem.
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